A partial taxonomy of various ideas and activities that gray zone concepts encapsulate I have argued, in part, that the gray zone concept merely puts a new spin on older and more well-understood ideas from political science, military history, and strategic theory about how actors pursue strategic objectives under constraint. While Mazarr’s re-articulation of the concept rectifies some of its most egregious flaws, Mazarr ultimately cannot save gray zone theories from their own gaping conceptual holes. Specifically, I argue once again that the gray zone concept is neither novel nor useful on its own terms.

While Mazarr is certainly correct to express concern over enemy strategies - novel or otherwise - I nonetheless remain unconvinced that the gray zone concept is not just another example of the strategic studies community needlessly confusing itself by generating new terminology to replace what is not broken. However, Mazarr nonetheless asserts that gray zone campaigns today differ in their “coherence, intentionality, and urgency,” thus justifying them as a “distinct approach to strategy.” Mazarr concedes the main points of my critique, noting that I am correct to say that the gray zone concept is hopelessly muddled and is not novel. Mazzarr thinks that there’s more to the concept than I give credit for. In a previous article here at War on the Rocks, I argued that the “gray zone” concept - used to describe the strategic behavior of everyone from the Islamic State to Vladimir Putin - is hopelessly muddled and does not contribute much of value to the defense policy discussion.

Abandon all hope ye who enter here